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Trial: Amend Article 3 of Chapter 8 of Title 17 of the Official Code 
of Georgia Annotated, Relating to Conduct of Trial Proceedings, so 
as to Repeal Provisions Relating to the Testimony of a Child Ten 
Years Old or Younger by Closed Circuit Television and Persons 
Entitled to be Present; Provide for the Testimony of Individuals 
Under 18 years of Age Outside the Physical Presence of an 
Accused in Criminal Proceedings Under Certain Circumstances; 
Provide for Related Matters; Repeal Conflicting Laws; and for 
Other Purposes 
CODE SECTIONS: O.C.G.A. § 17-8-55 (new) 
BILL NUMBER: HB 804 
ACT NUMBER: 512 
GEORGIA LAWS: 2014 Ga. Laws 205 
SUMMARY: The Act allows a court to order a child 
witness or victim of certain offenses 
under the age of seventeen to testify 
outside the physical presence of the 
accused provided the court finds the 
child is likely to suffer serious 
psychological or emotional distress or 
trauma that impairs the child’s ability 
to communicate. The Act also lists 
considerations for the judge to take into 
account when making this 
determination. It further provides what 
shall be included in the court’s order, 
as well as the method of such 
testimony. 
EFFECTIVE DATE:  July 1, 2014 
1
: Trial HB 804
Published by Reading Room, 2014
76 GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 31:1 
History 
In 1985, the General Assembly enacted Official Code of Georgia 
Annotated section 17-8-55.1 The Act allowed the testimony of a child 
victim to certain sexual offenses to be televised in the courtroom, 
rather than the child victim testifying in open court in the presence of 
the accused.2 First, the victim had to be fourteen years of age or 
younger.3 Second, the protections of Code section 17-8-55 extended 
only to the offenses of “cruelty to children, rape, sodomy, aggravated 
sodomy, molestation or aggravated molestation.”4 Third, the court 
had to find that there was a “substantial likelihood” that the child 
victim would “suffer severe emotional or mental distress” if he had to 
testify openly in the courtroom.5 Lastly, the court must have found 
that the defendant’s rights would “not be unduly prejudiced” by 
allowing the child victim to testify via broadcast testimony.6 The Act 
also provided that a limited number of parties were allowed to be 
present when the child testified. 7  By enacting this provision, the 
General Assembly sought to protect Georgia’s children by lessening 
the distress surrounding testifying against the accused.8 
In 1988, a horrific child molestation case, involving Georgia 
residents, brought the protection of child witnesses testifying against 
their accusers to the forefront of legislators’ attention.9 In 1990, the 
                                                                                                                 
 1. 1985 Ga. Laws 1190, § 1, at 1190 (formerly found at O.C.G.A. § 17-8-55 (1985)). 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id. at 1190–91 (“[T]he state or the defendant may apply for an order to televise out of open court 
the testimony of a child 14 years of age or younger”). 
 4. Criminal Procedure Sexual Offenses: Admissible Evidence: Minors, 1 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 294, 
294 (1985); 1985 Ga. Laws 1190, § 1, at 1191 (formerly found at O.C.G.A. § 17-8-55 (1985)) (noting 
the protections apply to “a child 14 years of age or younger who has been the victim of violations of 
subsection (b) of Code Section 16-5-70, Code Section 16-6-1, Code Section 16-6-2, or subsection (c) of 
Code Section 16-6-4.”). 
 5. 1985 Ga. Laws 1190, § 1, at 1191 (formerly found at O.C.G.A. § 17-8-55 (1985)). 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. (“In all proceedings in which the court grants an order to broadcast testimony, the court shall 
clear the courtroom of all other persons except the judge, counsel for the parties, the defendant, a bailiff, 
and a parent, guardian, child psychologist, or other qualified person appointed by the court to represent 
the interests of the witness.”). 
 8. Criminal Procedure Sexual Offenses: Admissible Evidence: Minors, supra note 4, at 294 (noting 
that this was only one of several victim protections proposed to the Georgia General Assembly and 
recognizing the specific focus of § 17-8-55 was “to minimize the possible trauma to children who are 
required to testify”). 
 9. Jill M. Wood, Criminal Procedure Trial: Amend Provisions Relating to Closed Circuit 
Television Testimony of Child Victims of Certain Sexual Offenses, 8 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 52, 53 (1992). 
2
Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 31, Iss. 1 [2014], Art. 5
https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol31/iss1/5
2014] LEGISLATIVE REVIEW 77 
United States Supreme Court noted that twenty-four states allow a 
victim of child abuse to testify via one-way closed circuit television, 
including Georgia. 10  A Confrontation Clause challenge to one of 
these statutes made it to the Court in the case of Maryland v. Craig, 
in which the Court upheld the use of one-way closed circuit 
television when such procedures are “necessary to protect a child 
witness from trauma that would be caused by testifying in the 
physical presence of the defendant.”11 
In 1991, guided by the Maryland statute that survived 
constitutional challenge in Craig, the General Assembly amended 
Code section 17-8-55.12 The Act allowed the child victim to testify 
outside the courtroom via a two-way closed circuit television.13 It 
changed, however, the age the child had to be to seek its protections 
to ten years of age and younger. 14  In addition to the originally 
covered offenses, the Act added sexual assault to the list.15 The court 
must have found the child’s testimony in the courtroom would “result 
in the child’s suffering serious emotional distress such that the child 
cannot reasonably communicate.”16 The Act also changed who could 
be present with the child, listing the presence of only the prosecutor, 
the defendant’s attorney, the judge, the operators of the equipment, 
and any person, in the court’s opinion, who contributed to the child’s 
wellbeing.17 
                                                                                                                 
Edward R. Dickey, operating pro se, cross-examined his two daughters, sixteen and eighteen, resulting 
in a tearful testimony. Father of Six Convicted of Molesting Two Daughters, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Nov. 
5, 1988), http://www.apnewsarchive.com/1988/Father-of-Six-Convicted-Of-Molesting-Two-Daughters/
id-f47e4cd7552f08df8248f32353f52ba3. Although Dickey was convicted for the molestation of his two 
teenage daughters, the prosecutors dropped the charges of molestation of his thirteen-year-old daughter 
in order to prevent trauma she would endure from testifying at trial. Id. 
 10. Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 854–55 (1990). 
 11. Id. at 855, 857 (noting the State’s showing of necessity “must of course be a case-specific one”). 
 12. 1991 Ga. Laws 1377, § 1, at 1378 (formerly found at O.C.G.A. § 17-8-55 (1991)); Wood, supra 
note 9, at 56. 
 13. 1991 Ga. Laws 1377, § 1, at 1378 (formerly found at O.C.G.A. § 17-8-55 (1991)). 
 14. Id.; Wood, supra note 9, at 55 (noting SB 178 originally set the age at fourteen years and 
younger, which was in line with the original Act, but an amendment in the House set the age to ten years 
and younger). 
 15. 1991 Ga. Laws 1377, § 1, at 1378 (formerly found at O.C.G.A. § 17-8-55 (1991)); Wood, supra 
note 9, at 55 (stating the offenses of statutory rape and enticing a child for indecent purposes were 
included in the proposed bill, but were seen as too broad and later dropped). 
 16. 1991 Ga. Laws 1377, § 1, at 1378 (formerly found at O.C.G.A. § 17-8-55 (1991)). 
 17. Id. 
3
: Trial HB 804
Published by Reading Room, 2014
78 GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 31:1 
The narrow purview of this Code section, however, left some child 
victims outside of its protections.18 For example, an eleven-year-old 
child abuse victim, who fell just outside of the statute’s protections 
for those ten years and younger, had to testify inside the courtroom in 
the presence of the defendant, and as a result, he suffered severe 
distress.19 Keeping Georgia’s children victims and witnesses in mind 
and focusing on similar laws in other states, Representative Edward 
Lindsey (R-54th) with the help of District Attorney Paul Howard 
introduced House Bill (HB) 804 during the 2014 session of the 
General Assembly. 20  The purpose of HB 804 was to protect 
Georgia’s children from trauma from testifying in front of the 
accused21, and to bring Georgia in line with the majority of other 
states.22 
Bill Tracking of HB 804 
Consideration and Passage by the House 
Representatives Edward Lindsey (R-54th), Buzz Brockway (R-
102nd), LaDawn Jones (D-62nd), Matt Ramsey (R-72nd), and B.J. 
Pak (R-108th) sponsored HB 804.23 The House read the bill for the 
                                                                                                                 
 18. Audio Recording of Senate Judiciary Non-Civil Committee, Mar. 6, 2014 at 4 min., 43 sec. 
(remarks by District Attorney Paul Howard) (on file with Georgia State University Law Review) 
[hereinafter Senate Recording 1] (describing a sexual abuse case tried in Fulton County, where the child 
was eleven years old—outside of the prior statute’s protections (ten and under)—and he was forced to 
testify, resulting in additional psychological damage and distress). 
 19. Id. 
 20. HB 804, as introduced, 2014 Ga. Gen. Assem.; Telephone Interview with Rep. Edward Lindsey 
(R-54th) (Apr. 4, 2014) [hereinafter Lindsey Interview]. 
 21. Audio Recording of Senate Judiciary Non-Civil Committee, Mar. 12, 2014 at 8 min., 46 sec. 
(remarks by Rep. Edward Lindsey (R-54th)) (on file with Georgia State University Law Review) 
[hereinafter Senate Recording 2]. More specifically, the purpose is to protect children who fell outside 
of the prior statute’s protections. Id. 
 22. Lindsey Interview, supra note 20. For those states that have such protections, only one state 
limits their protections of child victims to ten years of age or younger, which was the age specified in 
Georgia’s prior statute. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 3514 (West 2014) (“[A] court may order that the 
testimony of a child victim or witness less than 11 years of age . . . .”). Many more states extend their 
statutes to protect children under sixteen years old. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 15-25-3 (West 2014) 
(extending to child witnesses “under the age of 16”); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 92.54 (West 2013) (same); W. 
VA. CODE § 62-6B-2 (West 2013) (same). Fewer states extend the age to eighteen years. See IOWA 
CODE § 915.38 (West 2014) (protecting until age eighteen). 
 23. HB 804, as introduced, 2014 Ga. Gen. Assem.; Georgia General Assembly, HB 804, Bill 
Tracking, http://www.legis.ga.gov/legislation/em-US/Display/20132014/HB/804. 
4
Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 31, Iss. 1 [2014], Art. 5
https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol31/iss1/5
2014] LEGISLATIVE REVIEW 79 
first time on January 23, 2014.24 Speaker of the House David Ralston 
(R-7th) assigned the bill to the House Judiciary Non-Civil 
Committee.25 The Committee offered several changes to the bill and 
favorably reported a Committee substitute on February 18, 2014.26 
The substitute contained several substantive changes. First, it 
added that the bill applies to proceedings when a child is a witness to 
or an alleged victim of simple assault, simple battery, battery, 
stalking, and violation of family violence order to the crimes. 27 
Representative Lindsey offered the additional crimes, upon the 
recommendation of Cherokee County Solicitor General Jessica Moss, 
because minors are often forced to testify in those situations.28 
Second, the substitute added another layer to the standard by 
which a judge determines whether to allow a child to testify 
remotely.29 It required the court to find not only that a child is likely 
to suffer serious psychological or emotional distress, but also that 
such distress impairs the child’s ability to communicate. 30 
Representative Lindsey offered the change in response to the 
committee’s concern that, in the bill’s initial version, the child’s 
psychological or emotional distress was not tied to the child’s ability 
to testify.31 He reasoned that, in the abundance of caution given other 
states’ rulings on similar statutes, it is appropriate to “tighten the 
language.”32 
Third, the substitute revised the bill’s language regarding how a 
court establishes that a child is likely to suffer serious psychological 
or emotional distress as a result of testifying.33 The bill’s original 
                                                                                                                 
 24. State of Georgia Final Composite Status Sheet, HB 804, May 1, 2014. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. 
 27. HB 804 (HCS), § 1, p. 1, ln. 17–19, 2014, Ga. Gen Assem. The bill’s initial version included the 
following crimes: murder; kidnapping cruelty to children; rape; sodomy/aggravated sodomy; statutory 
rape; child molestation/aggravated child molestation; enticing a child for indecent purposes; sexual 
assault; pimping; pandering by compulsion; incest; sexual battery; aggravated sexual battery; armed 
robbery; and gang activity. HB 804, as introduced, § 1, p. 1, ln. 17–19, 2014 Ga. Gen. Assem. 
 28. Video Recording of House Judiciary Non-Civil Committee, Feb 17, 2014 at 33 min., 58 sec 
(remarks by Rep. Edward Lindsey (R-54th)), http://www.house.ga.gov/Committees/en-
US/CommitteeArchives146.aspx [hereinafter House Video, Feb. 17]. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. at 31 min. 8 sec. (remarks by Rep. Edward Lindsey (R-54th)). 
 32. Id. 
 33. HB 804 (HCS), § 1, p. 2, ln. 28–30, 2014 Ga. Gen Assem. 
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language provided that the presence of any one of several enumerated 
circumstances “establish[es] that the child is likely to suffer serious 
psychological or emotional distress as a result of testifying in the 
presence of the accused.” 34  In one Committee meeting, Sandra 
Michaels of the Association of Co-defense Lawyers expressed 
concern that the bill’s original language took discretion from the 
court. 35  More specifically, Ms. Michaels believed that the bill 
allowed the mere presence of one of the factors to establish the 
child’s likelihood to suffer serious psychological or emotional 
distress.36 Acknowledging Ms. Michael’s concerns, the substitute’s 
language provided that the court may consider any number of factors 
in determining the establishment of such distress, eliminating the 
language that automatically established distress based on a factor’s 
mere presence.37 
Fourth, where the bill required a judge’s order allowing the use of 
remote testimony to include a list of persons allowed to be in the 
presence of the child during such testimony, the substitute eliminated 
a non-exclusive list of those allowable persons.38 The substitute also 
specifically prohibits pro se defendants from being present during 
such testimony. 39  Representative Lindsey offered these changes, 
again, to merely “tighten the language.”40 Lastly, where two of the 
factors that a court may consider in determining whether to allow 
remote testimony used “psychological harm” language, the substitute 
replaced that language with “psychological or emotional distress” in 
favor of consistency.41 The House read the Committee substitute as 
amended on February 25, 2014 before passing it that day by a 
unanimous 163 to 0 vote.42 
                                                                                                                 
 34. HB 804, as introduced, § 1, p. 2, ln. 28–31, 2014 Ga. Gen. Assem. 
 35. House Video, Feb. 17, supra note 28, at 34 min. 0 sec. (remarks by Sandra Michaels). 
 36. Id. 
 37. HB 804 (HCS), § 1, p. 2, ln. 28–30, 2014 Ga. Gen Assem. 
 38. Id. at § 1, p. 3, ln. 71, 2014 Ga. Gen Assem. The eliminated list included “the judge, the 
prosecuting attorney, the attorney representing the accused, [and] individuals necessary to operate 
equipment necessary to transmit the proceeding . . . .” HB 804, as introduced, § 1, p. 3, ln 73-75, 2014 
Ga. Gen Assem. 
 39. Id. at § 1, p. 3, ln. 78, 2014 Ga. Gen Assem. 
 40. House Video, Feb. 17, supra note 28, at 32 min. 48 sec. (remarks by Rep. Lindsey (R-54th)). 
 41. HB 804, as introduced, § 1, p. 2, ln. 34, p. 3 ln 64, 2014, Ga. Gen. Assem.; HB 804 (HCS), § 1, 
p. 2 ln. 33, p. 3, ln. 65, 2014 Ga. Gen Assem. 
 42. Georgia House of Representatives Voting Record, HB 804 (Feb. 25, 2014). 
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Consideration and Passage by the Senate 
Senator John Crosby (R-13th) sponsored HB 804 in the Senate.43 
The Senate read the bill for the first time on February 26, 2014.44 
Lieutenant Governor Casey Cagle (R) assigned the bill to the Senate 
Judiciary Non-Civil Committee. 45  The Committee offered several 
changes to the bill, and favorably reported a committee substitute on 
March 13, 2014.46 
The Senate Committee substitute, like the House Committee 
substitute, also contained several substantive changes. First, the 
substitute provides that a “parent, legal guardian, or custodian of a 
child” may move the court to hold an evidentiary hearing to 
determine whether a child shall testify outside the presence of the 
accused, replacing the bill’s “proponent of the child” language.47 
Senator Curt Thompson (D-5th) offered the change to the above 
legally defined terms after expressing his concern that a proponent of 
a child “could literally be anybody.”48 Representative Lindsey also 
recommended the change, considering it an improvement.49 
Second, the substitute changed the definition of child from 
individuals under eighteen to individuals under seventeen based on 
the fact that the law in only a very small minority of states goes as 
high as eighteen. 50  Third, it replaced “distress” with “distress or 
trauma,” describing the effect on a child witness or victim that 
warrants remote testimony.51 Senator Thompson originally offered to 
replace distress with trauma to track the Supreme Court’s Maryland 
v. Craig language. 52  Representative Lindsey opposed that offer, 
                                                                                                                 
 43. Georgia General Assembly, HB 804, Bill Tracking, http://www.legis.ga.gov/legislation/em-
US/Display/20132014/HB/804. 
 44. State of Georgia Final Composite Status Sheet, HB 804, May 1, 2014. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. 
 47. HB 804 (SCSFA), § 1, p. 1, ln. 20-21, 2014 Ga. Gen Assem. 
 48. Senate Recording 2, supra note 21, at 33 min., 46 sec., (remarks by Sen. Curt Thompson (D-
5th)). Concerned that a proponent of the child “could literally be anybody,” Senator Thompson preferred 
“legally definable terms.” Id. 
 49. Id. at 35 min., 7 sec., (remarks by Rep. Edward Lindsey (R-54th)). 
 50. HB 804 (SCSFA), § 1, p. 1, ln. 14, 2014 Ga. Gen Assem.; Senate Recording 2, supra note 21, at 
20 min., 35 sec., (remarks by Jack Martin, Georgia Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers). 
 51. HB 804 (SCSFA), § 1, p. 2, ln. 27, 2014 Ga. Gen Assem. 
 52. Senate Recording 2, supra note 21, at 39 min., 43 sec., (remarks by Sen. Curt Thompson (D-
5th)). 
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pointing out that while the Court in Maryland v. Craig used trauma, 
the Maryland statute upheld by the Court used distress. 53  After 
additional discussion, the Committee decided to use both words in 
the disjunctive. 54  Finally, the substitute added that if the court 
precludes the accused or the accused’s counsel from being physically 
present during the remote testimony, the court must likewise preclude 
the prosecuting attorney.55 
The Senate read the Committee substitute as amended on March 
13, 2014.56 The Senate tabled the bill on March 8, 2014 before taking 
it from the table and reading it a third time that same day.57 On 
March 18, 2014, the Senate passed the Committee substitute by a 
unanimous 54 to 0 vote.58 On March 20, 2014, the House voted 163 
to 0 in favor of the Senate Committee’s substitute.59 HB 804 was sent 
to Governor Nathan Deal on March 27, 2014 and signed into law on 
April 15, 2014.60 
The Act 
The Act amends Article 3 of Chapter 8 of Title 17 of the Official 
Code of Georgia Annotated, relating to the ability of child victims of 
certain crimes to testify outside the presence of the accused.61 Its 
purpose is to protect children who fell outside of the prior Code’s 
scope, and to bring Georgia “in line” with other states.62 It seeks to 
effectuate that purpose by raising the protected age, increasing the 
number of crime that invoke the statute’s protections, providing 
protection to a child witness of those crimes, providing the court 
additional guidance in determining whether to protect a child witness, 
and increasing the allowable methods to broadcast the testimony.63 
                                                                                                                 
 53. Id. at 41 min., 28 sec. (remarks by Rep. Edward Lindsey (R-54th)). 
 54. Id. at 44 min., 16 sec. (remarks by Sen. Jesse Stone (R-23th)). 
 55. HB 804 (SCSFA), § 1, p. 3, ln. 80, 2014 Ga. Gen Assem. 
 56. State of Georgia Final Composite Status Sheet, HB 804, May 1, 2014. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Georgia Senate Voting Record, HB 804 (Mar. 18, 2014). 
 59. Georgia House of Representatives Voting Record, HB 804 (Mar. 20, 2014). 
 60. Georgia General Assembly, HB 804, Bill Tracking, http://www.legis.ga.gov/legislation/em-
US/Display/20132014/HB/804. See O.C.G.A. § 17-8-55 (Supp. 2014). 
 61. O.C.G.A. § 17-8-55 (Supp. 2014). 
 62. Lindsey Interview, supra note 20; Senate Recording 2, supra note 21, at 8 min., 46 sec., 
(remarks by Rep. Edward Lindsey (R-54th). 
 63. O.C.G.A. § 17-8-55 (Supp. 2014). 
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Section One of the Act substantially revises Code section 17-8-
55. 64  The previous Code section made closed-circuit television 
testimony available to child victims of certain crimes ten years of age 
and younger.65 The revision raises the age to under seventeen and 
makes remote testimony available to witnesses of certain crimes as 
well.66 It also drastically expands the list of crimes which invoke the 
statute.67 The original Code section included only cruelty to children, 
rape, sodomy, and aggravated sodomy, child molestation and 
aggravated child molestation, and sexual assault.68 The revision adds 
murder, simple assault, simple battery, battery, kidnapping, stalking, 
violation of family violence order, statutory rape, enticing a child for 
indecent purposes, pimping, pandering by compulsion, incest, sexual 
battery, aggravated sexual battery, armed robbery, and unlawful 
street gang acts.69 
Section One of the Act further revises the Code by providing for 
an evidentiary hearing to determine whether a child shall testify 
outside the presence of the accused.70 The Act also specifies that only 
the prosecuting attorney, the parent, legal guardian, custodian of a 
child, or the court itself may move the court to hold such a hearing.71 
Section One also broadens the standard that a court applies in 
determining whether a child may testify outside the presence of the 
accused by directing it to allow such testimony if the child will likely 
“suffer serious psychological or emotional distress or trauma,” 72 
expanding on the previous Code’s “emotional distress,” standard.73 
Moreover, the revision adds that a judge must find by a 
preponderance of the evidence that the child will likely suffer such 
distress or trauma.74 The Act also adds eleven factors that a judge 
may consider when determining whether a preponderance of the 
evidence has been shown, providing substantially more guidance 
                                                                                                                 
 64. Id. 
 65. 1991 Ga. Laws 1377, § 1, at 1378 (formerly found at O.C.G.A. § 17-8-55(a) (1991)). 
 66. O.C.G.A. § 17-8-55(a), (b) (Supp. 2014). 
 67. O.C.G.A. § 17-8-55(b) (Supp. 2014). 
 68. 1991 Ga. Laws 1377, § 1, at 1378 (formerly found at O.C.G.A. § 17-8-55(a) (1991)). 
 69. O.C.G.A. § 17-8-55(b) (Supp. 2014). 
 70. O.C.G.A. § 17-8-55(c) (Supp. 2014). 
 71. Id. 
 72. O.C.G.A. § 17-8-55(d) (Supp. 2014). 
 73. 1991 Ga. Laws 1377, § 1, at 1378 (formerly found at O.C.G.A. § 17-8-55(a)(2) (1991)). 
 74. O.C.G.A. § 17-8-55(d) (Supp. 2014). 
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than the original Code.75 The previous Code offered no guidance for 
courts determining whether would likely suffer distress from 
testifying in court.76 
The Act further revises the Code by requiring that a court order 
state the court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law supporting its 
determination whether or not to allow remote testimony. 77  The 
revisions provide a non-exclusive list of certain details that the court 
must include in the order.78  Finally, the Act adds guidelines 
regarding the allowable methods of out-of-court testimony, ensuring 
that such testimony is reliable and capable of transmitting in real 
time. 79  Such methods include, but are not limited to, a two-way 
closed-circuit television broadcast and an internet broadcast.80 The 
previous Code section limited the broadcast method of a child 
witness’s out-of-court testimony to two-way closed circuit 
television.81 
Analysis 
Several legal issues may arise from the Act’s changes to the 
statute. Criminal defendants may argue that any of the following 
violates the Confrontation Clause: the increase in age, the statute’s 
protection of witnesses to a crime, the expanded number of crimes 
invoking the statute, and the expansion of the standard by which the 
court makes the determination to allow remote testimony. The 
revision may give rise to arguments that all individuals who may—
                                                                                                                 
 75. Id. The factors include: (1) the heinousness of the offense, (2) the child’s age or preexisting 
emotional state, (3) the relationship to the person who committed the offense, (4) whether the offense 
occurred over an ongoing period of time, (5) whether a deadly weapon was used, (6) whether the child 
sustained physical injury, (7) whether the perpetrator threatened the child or third person not to report 
the crime, (8) whether the perpetrator threatened to incarcerate or dissolve the family of the child if the 
crime was reported, (9) whether the perpetrator threatened a witness, (10) the accused’s access to the 
child, and (11) expert testimony as to the child’s susceptibility to “physical or emotional distress or 
trauma required to testify” before the accused. Id. 
 76. See 1991 Ga. Laws 1377, § 1, at 1378 (formerly found at O.C.G.A. § 17-8-55 (1991)). 
 77. O.C.G.A. § 17-8-55(e) (Supp. 2014). 
 78. Id. 
 79. O.C.G.A. § 17-8-55(f) (Supp. 2014). 
 80. Id. 
 81. 1991 Ga. Laws 1377, § 1, at 1378 (formerly found at O.C.G.A. § 17-8-55(a) (1991)). 
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under the more liberal requirements—invoke the statute’s protection 
do not necessarily deserve it.82 
The Confrontation Clause 
The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment of the United 
States Constitution provides the accused in a criminal trial the right 
to confront the witnesses against him.83 As noted by the Supreme 
Court in Maryland v. Craig, the Confrontation Clause’s purpose “is 
to ensure the reliability of the evidence against a criminal defendant 
by subjecting it to rigorous testing in the context of an adversary 
proceeding before the trier of fact”84 because “[i]t is always more 
difficult to tell a lie about a person ‘to his face’ than ‘behind his 
back.’”85 The Confrontation Clause provides a criminal defendant 
with the following rights: (1) a personal examination of the witness; 
(2) while the witness is under oath; (3) the right to cross-examine the 
witness; and (4) the right of the jury to obverse the witness’s 
demeanor in assessing his or her creditably.86 In Coy v. Iowa, the 
United States Supreme Court recognized that the right guaranteed by 
the Confrontation Clause consists of a “face-to-face meeting” 
between the accused and the accuser.87 Because HB 804 allows a 
child to testify outside the defendant’s presence under certain 
circumstances, the bill may face constitutional difficulty as it directly 
conflicts with the defendant’s right to a “face-to-face” 
confrontation.88 
                                                                                                                 
 82. For example, protecting a sixteen-year-old witness to gang activity may not justify infringing a 
defendant’s right to confrontation as would protecting a ten-year old victim to child-molestation. 
 83. U.S. CONST. amend. VI; Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1015 (1988) (“The Sixth Amendment 
gives a criminal defendant the right ‘to be confronted with the witnesses against him.’”). 
 84. Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 845 (1990) (“The primary object of the constitutional 
provision in question was to prevent depositions or ex parte affidavits, such as were sometimes admitted 
in civil cases, being used against the prisoner in lieu of a personal examination and cross-examination of 
the witness in which the accused has an opportunity, not only of testing the recollection and sifting the 
conscience of the witness, but of compelling him to stand face to face with the jury in order that they 
may look at him, and judge by his demeanor upon the stand and the manner in which he gives his 
testimony whether he is worthy of belief.”) (quoting Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 240 (1895)). 
 85. Coy, 487 U.S. at 1019. 
 86. Maryland, 497 U.S. at 845–46. 
 87. Coy, 487 U.S. at 1017. 
 88. O.C.G.A. § 17-8-55(d) (Supp. 2014) (“The court may order a child to testify outside the physical 
presence of the accused, provided that the court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that such child 
is likely to suffer serious psychological or emotional distress or trauma which impairs such child’s 
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The United States Supreme Court has twice addressed this issue of 
whether a state statute allowing a child to testify outside the presence 
of the defendant violates the Confrontation Clause of the Six 
Amendment. 89  Although the Court in Coy held the defendant’s 
Confrontation Clause rights were violated when the trial court 
allowed two witnesses to testify behind a screen, it left for another 
day “the question whether any exceptions exist” to the defendant’s 
right to confront the witnesses face-to-face.90 The Court noted that if 
there were such exceptions, they would only be allowed “when 
necessary to further an important public policy,” recognizing it would 
take more than generalized findings. 91  In 1990, the Court in 
Maryland v. Craig answered the question left open in Coy in the 
affirmative. 92  The Court recognized that the right to confront a 
witness in a face-to-face meeting is only a preference and not a 
mandate, as it is not “an indispensable element of the Six 
Amendment’s guarantee.”93 The State’s interest in protecting child 
abuse victims serves as an exception that “may be sufficiently 
important to outweigh, at least in some cases, a defendant’s right to 
face his or her accusers in court.”94 
For a state statute to not run afoul of the Confrontation Clause, the 
state must make “an adequate showing of necessity.”95  First, the 
requisite finding of necessity requires a court to make a case-specific 
inquiry.96 In HB 804, the requirement that a trial court make a case-
                                                                                                                 
ability to communicate as a result of testifying in the presence of the accused.”). 
 89. Coy, 487 U.S. at 1019 (addressing the issue of whether an Iowa statute, which allowed a screen 
to be placed between the defendant and the witnesses while they testified, violated the defendant’s right 
to confront); Maryland 497 U.S. at 840 (deciding “whether the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth 
Amendment categorically prohibits a child witness in a child abuse case from testifying against a 
defendant at trial, outside the defendant’s physical presence, by one-way closed circuit television.”). 
 90. Coy, 487 U.S. at 1021. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Maryland, 497 U.S. at 855 (holding when the State makes a requisite finding of necessity, “[it’s] 
interest in protecting the child witnesses from the trauma of testifying in a child abuse case is 
sufficiently important to justify the use of a special procedure that permits a child witness in such cases 
to testify at trial against a defendant in the absence of face-to-face confrontation”). 
 93. Id. at 848–49 (“The law in its wisdom declares that the rights of the public shall not be wholly 
sacrificed in order that an incidental benefit may be preserved to the accused.”) (quoting Mattox v. 
United States, 156 U.S. 237, 243 (1895)). 
 94. Maryland, 497 U.S. at 853. 
 95. Id. at 856. 
 96. Id. at 855 (“The requisite finding of necessity must of course be a case-specific one: The trial 
court must hear evidence and determine whether use of the one-way closed circuit television procedure 
is necessary to protect the welfare of the particular child witness who seeks to testify”) (citing Globe 
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specific inquiry is expressly provided for in the language of the 
statute, as it mandates that a court hold an evidentiary hearing on this 
issue.97 Second, to satisfy the requisite finding of necessity, the trial 
court must find that testifying in front of the defendant would 
traumatize the child witness.98 HB 804 meets this requirement as 
well. It allows a court to order a child to testify outside the 
defendant’s presence only if “the court finds by a preponderance of 
the evidence that such child is likely to suffer serious psychological 
or emotional distress or trauma which impairs such child’s ability to 
communicate as a result of testifying in the presence of the 
accused.” 99  In other words, the judge must find the child would 
suffer trauma and that testifying in the defendant’s presence causes 
the trauma. Moreover, the Act provides eleven circumstances to help 
the trial court make this determination. 100  Third, to satisfy the 
requisite finding of the necessity, the trial court must find the child 
witness would suffer more than de minimus emotional distress, 
meaning “more than ‘mere nervousness or excitement or some 
reluctance to testify.’” 101  The Court declined to decide what the 
minimum is for the showing of emotional trauma, as the Maryland 
                                                                                                                 
Newspaper Co. v. Super. Ct. for Norfolk Cnty., 457 U.S. 597, 608–90 (1982)). 
 97. O.C.G.A. § 17-8-55(c) (Supp. 2014) (“The court, upon the motion of the prosecuting attorney or 
the parent, legal guardian, or custodian of a child, or on its own motion, shall hold an evidentiary 
hearing to determine whether a child shall testify outside the physical presence of the accused.”). 
 98. Maryland, 497 U.S. at 856 (“The trial court must also find that the child witness would be 
traumatized, not by the courtroom generally, but by the presence of the defendant.”) (citing Arizona v. 
Wilhite, 772 P.2d 582 (Ariz. 1989); Connecticut v. Bonello, 554 A.2d 277 (Conn. 1989); Missouri v. 
Davidson, 764 S.W.2d 731 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989); Pennsylvania v. Ludwig, 531 A.2d 459 (Pa. Super 
1987)). 
 99. O.C.G.A. § 17-8-55(d) (Supp. 2014) (emphasis added). 
 100. O.C.G.A. § 17-8-55(d)(1)-(11) (Supp. 2014). For example, a few of the considerations listed in 
the statute are as follows: 
(1) The manner of the commission of the offense being particularly heinous or 
characterized by aggravating circumstances; 
(2) The child’s age or susceptibility to psychological or emotional distress or trauma on 
account of a physical or mental condition which existed before the alleged commission of 
the offense; 
(3) At the time of the alleged offense the accused was: (A) The parent, guardian, legal 
custodian, or other person responsible for the custody or care of the child at the relevant 
time; or (B) A person who maintains or maintained an ongoing personal relationship with 
such child’s parent, guardian, legal custodian, or other person responsible for the custody 
or care of the child at the relevant time and the relationship involved the person living in 
or frequent and repeated presence in the same household or premises as the child. 
O.C.G.A. § 17-8-55(d)(1)-(3) (Supp. 2014). See also supra note 75. 
 101. Maryland, 497 U.S. at 856 (quoting Wildermuth v. Maryland, 530 A.2d 275, 289 (Md. 1987)). 
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statute’s requirement of “serious emotional distress such that the 
child cannot reasonably communicate” sufficed. 102  Although the 
Court did not decide what is de minimus, HB 804 closely tracks the 
language of the Maryland statute, which the Court said “clearly 
suffices to meet constitutional standards.” 103  HB 804 requires 
“serious psychological or emotional distress or trauma which impairs 
such child’s ability to communicate.” 104  Though the language is 
slightly different than the language approved by the Supreme 
Court, 105  it still contains the same elements: serious emotional 
distress and that such distress affects the child’s ability to 
communicate. HB 804 simply adds “psychological” distress and 
replaces Maryland’s statute language of “such that the child cannot 
reasonably communicate” with “which impairs such child’s ability to 
communicate.”106 Thus, the Act requires the trial court go through 
certain steps before ordering a child testify outside the defendant’s 
presence, and it ensures that the requisite finding of necessity is met. 
Georgia has an important state interest in protecting its children 
from trauma as a result of testifying in the presence of the accused. 
However, there are inconsistencies between Georgia’s Act and 
Maryland v. Craig that may cause the Bill to face constitutional 
challenge. First, the Craig court dealt with the statute as applied to a 
six-year-old girl.107 The Georgia Act defines a child as “an individual 
who is under [seventeen] years of age.”108 The question becomes will 
such a statute still be constitutional when applied to a sixteen-year-
old or any child over the age of the six-year-old victim in Craig?109 
While the age may be relevant to the analysis, the trial court must 
                                                                                                                 
 102. Id. 
 103. O.C.G.A. § 17-8-55(d) (Supp. 2014); Maryland, 497 U.S. at 856. 
 104. O.C.G.A. § 17-8-55(d) (Supp. 2014). 
 105. Compare O.C.G.A. § 17-8-55(d) (Supp. 2014) (“[S]uch child is likely to suffer serious 
psychological or emotional distress or trauma which impairs such child’s ability to communicate as a 
result of testifying in the presence of the accused”), with Maryland, 497 U.S. at 856 (noting the 
Maryland statute requires “a determination that the child witness will suffer ‘serious emotional distress 
such that the child cannot reasonably communicate’”). 
 106. Maryland, 497 U.S. at 856; O.C.G.A. § 17-8-55(d) (Supp. 2014). 
 107. Maryland, 497 U.S. at 840. 
 108. O.C.G.A. § 17-8-55(a) (Supp. 2014). 
 109. The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals has upheld the Child Witness’ Rights Act, a federal rule 
similar to O.C.G.A. § 17-8-55, as applied to a twelve-year-old. See infra note 123 and accompanying 
text. It is also important to note the federal Act protects under age eighteen, which is a broader 
protection than O.C.G.A. § 17-8-55. See infra note 123 and accompanying text. 
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still find “serious psychological or emotional distress or trauma 
which impairs such child’s ability to communicate,” regardless of the 
age of the child, so long as the child’s age falls within the statute’s 
requirement of under seventeen.110 Therefore, the protections cannot 
be provided to sixteen-year-old witnesses unless the trial court makes 
this specific finding of trauma that impairs their ability to 
communicate. 
Persuasive authority exists supporting the Act’s age increase as at 
least one state supreme court has upheld against a Confrontation 
Clause challenges its statute protecting individuals under 
seventeen.111 In State v, Crandall, the New Jersey Supreme Court 
held that, “[b]ecause N.J.S.A. 2A:84A-32.4 allows a witness to 
testify outside the presence o the jury only if such a procedure is 
necessary, the statute is facially constitutional.”112 Although Crandall 
involved a seven year-old child victim, the court did not discuss the 
statute’s age range and seemed to concern itself only with Maryland 
v. Craig’s three explicit requirements.113 If courts determining the 
constitutionality of the Act follow Crandall’s analysis, the increase in 
age should not render it unconstitutional. 
Second, the Craig Court dealt with the statute as applied to a 
“victim of child abuse.”114 Also, its holding is specific to child abuses 
cases.115 The Georgia Act, however, includes more crimes than just 
those related to child abuse, whether they are physical, sexual, or 
emotional abuse.116 While the victims of child-abuse-related crimes 
                                                                                                                 
 110. O.C.G.A. § 17-8-55(d) (Supp. 2014). 
 111. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:84A-32.4(b) (West); State v. Crandall, 577 A.2d 483, 487 (1990). 
 112. Crandall, 577 A.2d at 487. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 840 (1990). 
 115. Id. at 855 (holding “the state interest in protecting child witnesses from the trauma of testifying 
in a child abuse case is sufficiently important to justify the use of a special procedure that permits a 
child witness in such cases to testify at trial against a defendant in the absence of face-to-face 
confrontation with the defendant.”) (emphasis added). 
 116. O.C.G.A. § 17-8-55(b) (Supp. 2014) (“This Code section shall apply to all proceedings when a 
child is a witness to or an alleged victim of a violation of Code Section 16-5-1 [Murder], 16-5-20 
[Simple Assault], 16-5-23 [Simple Battery]. 16-5-23.1 [Battery], 16-5-40 [Kidnapping], 16-5-70 
[Cruelty to Children], 16-5-90 [Stalking], 16-5-95 [Violation of Family Violence Order], 16-6-1 [Rape], 
16-6-2 [Sodomy; Aggravated Sodomy], 16-6-3 [Statutory Rape], 16-6-4 [Child Molestation; Aggravated 
Child Molestation], 16-6-5 [Enticing a Child for Indecent Purposes], 16-6-5.1 [Sexual Assault], 16-6-11 
[Pimping], 16-6-14 [Pandering by Compulsion], 16-6-22 [Incest], 16-6-22.1 [Sexual Battery], 16-6-22.2 
[Aggravated Sexual Battery], 16-8-41 [Armed Robbery; Robbery by Intimidation]; or 16-15-4 
[Unlawful Acts; Penalties].”). 
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have the support of Craig, the testimony of victims of the other 
crimes included in the Act—i.e., armed robbery—outside the 
presence of the defendant stands on much shakier ground. 
Some states however, do not limit the crimes that invoke their 
statutes and allow a child witness to testify remotely so long as the 
child was a victim or witness to a crime.117 The Kentucky Supreme 
Court has held its state statute facially constitutional, although it does 
not limit its list of crimes, because it satisfies the United States 
Supreme Court’s explicit requirements. 118  Despite the declared 
constitutionality of similar state statutes, courts ruling under the Act 
may deny protection to a minor victim or witness to a crime such as 
armed robbery more frequently because it is a non-sexual crime and 
may not have been conducted in the home where the accused 
exercises control over the witness. 
Third, the Craig Court addressed the statute as applied to a 
“victim.”119 HB 804 provides protection for both a child witness and 
a child victim.120 Will the application of such a statute to a child 
witness pass constitutional muster? Though the Court uses both 
“witness” and “victim” throughout the opinion, the holding is 
specific to the facts presented before the court at that time, which 
involved a child victim. The Act requires the same finding of distress 
or trauma that impairs the child’s ability to communicate, regardless 
of whether the testifying witness was the victim of the alleged crime 
or a witness thereto.121 While the court must find the same trauma, 
the facts as to who the witness is in relation to the crime may affect 
the balancing of whether the state’s interest outweighs the 
defendant’s confrontation rights. This question will likely be 
                                                                                                                 
 117. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-4251 (West 2014) (“This article applies to the testimony or 
statements of a minor in criminal proceedings involving acts committed against the minor or involving 
acts witnessed by the minor . . . .”); KY. REV STAT. ANN. § 421.350 (West 2014) (“This section applies 
only to a proceeding in the prosecution of an offense, including but not limited to [certain enumerated 
crimes] . . . when the act is alleged to have been committed against a child . . . .”) (emphasis added). 
 118. Sparkman v. Com., 250 S.W.3d 667, 669 (Ky. 2008) (“The constitutionality of this statute has 
been upheld by this Court. We noted that the statute allows a trial court to strike a proper balance 
between three competing interests: a) the criminal accused’s right to receive a fair trial; b) the child’s 
right to testify without undue distress or intimidation; and c) the Commonwealth’s interest in a truthful 
fact-finding process.”) (citing Com. v. Willis, 716 S.W.2d 224, 231 (Ky. 1986)). 
 119. See Maryland, 497 U.S. at 840. 
 120. O.C.G.A. § 17-8-55(b) (Supp. 2014) (“This Code section shall apply to all proceedings when a 
child is a witness to or an alleged victim . . . .”). 
 121. O.C.G.A. § 17-8-55(d) (Supp. 2014). 
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challenged. A survey of other states’ statutes, however, reveals that 
protecting a child witness to a crime is quite prevalent, making any 
finding of unconstitutionality on that ground doubtful.122 
The Eleventh Circuit has applied the Maryland v. Craig test on 
more than one occasion, although none of the cases appear to shed 
any light on the constitutionality of the Act’s specific protections of a 
child-witness to a crime.123 The Circuit’s most recent application of 
the test in United States v. Fee, however, suggests that the Act’s 
increase in the protected age to sixteen will pass constitutional 
muster.124 In Fee, the defendant, convicted on eight counts of child 
pornography, argued that the district court violated her right of 
confrontation by allowing her twelve-year-old daughter to testify via 
closed-circuit television.125 The court allowed the testimony under 
the federal Child Victims’ and Child Witness’ Rights Act, which 
permits children under the age of eighteen to testify remotely when 
the district court “finds that the child is unable to testify in open court 
in the presence of the defendant.”126 After a full Maryland v. Craig 
analysis, the court affirmed the district court ruling because it 
“complied with the procedures outlined in and made the findings 
required under the Child Right’s Act. And the [government] 
established that [the child-victim] would suffer trauma if forced to 
                                                                                                                 
 122. State’s with statutes protecting both child victims and witnesses include the following: Alabama 
(ALA. CODE § 15-25-3(West 2014)); Alaska (ALASKA STAT. § 12.45.046 (West 2014)); Arizona (ARIZ. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-4251 (West 2014)); Arkansas (ARK. CODE. ANN. § 16-43-1001 (West 2014)); 
Minnesota (MINN. STAT. § 595.02 (West 2014)); New Hampshire (N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 517:13-a 
(West 2014)); and Virginia (VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-67.9 (West 2014)). 
 123. Harrell v. Butterworth, 251 F.3d 926, 928 (11th Cir. 2001) (affirming the district court’s denial 
of defendant’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus where state trial court allowed foreign robbery 
victims to testify via satellite transmission); United States v. Yates, 438 F.3d 1307, 1316 (11th Cir. 
2006) (holding that foreign witness testimony via two-way video conference violated the defendant’s 
Sixth Amendment rights because “the prosecutor’s need for the video conference testimony to make a 
case and to expeditiously resolve it are not the type of public policies that are important enough to 
outweigh the Defendant’s rights to confront their accusers face-to-face”); Fuster-Escalona v. Florida 
Dep’t of Corr., 170 F. App’x 627, 629 (11th Cir. 2006) (affirming the district court’s denial of 
defendant’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus where four children-victims, who were five or six years 
old, testified via two-way closed circuit television); United States v. Fee, 491 F. App’x 151, 159 (11th 
Cir. 2012) (holding that a twelve-year-old child-victim’s testimony via two-way, closed-circuit 
television did not violate the defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights where the district court complied with 
the procedural requirements of a federal statute allowing such testimony). 
 124. Fee, 491 F. App’x at 159. 
 125. Id. at 151. 
 126. Id. at 159 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3509(b)(1)(B) (2006)). 
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testify in the [defendant’s] presence.”127 Because HB 804’s age limit 
is lower than that of the federal statute before the Elventh Circuit in 
Fee, the increase in protected age to sixteen is probably safe from 
constitutional challenge. 
Despite the constitutional uncertainty surrounding the Act’s 
extension to child-witnesses of a crime, Fulton County District 
Attorney Paul Howard is confident that the Confrontation Clause 
issues have been thoroughly vetted with regards to the previous 
Code. It seems as if the General Assembly crafted the 1991 Code to 
stay within the bounds of the Maryland v. Craig guidelines, and this 
Act does nothing to disturb that. 128  It also appears that the Act 
addressed all of the issues that concerned its sponsors. The primary 
purpose was to protect children who fell outside of the previous 
statute’s scope.129 By increasing the protected age range by six years, 
more than doubling the list of crimes that invoke the statute, and 
providing protection of child witnesses to those crimes, the Act 
drastically broadens the class of individuals that Georgia allows to 
testify outside the presence of the accused.130 
Amanda Trull & Kevin Coleman 
 
                                                                                                                 
 127. Id. 
 128. Video Recording of House Judiciary Non-Civil Committee, Feb. 15, 2014 at 22 min., 44 sec. 
(remarks by Fulton County District Attorney Paul Howard). 
 129. Lindsey Interview, supra note 20; Senate Recording 2, supra note 21, at 8 min., 46 sec., 
(remarks by Rep. Edward Lindsey (R-54th). 
 130. O.C.G.A. § 17-8-55(Supp. 2014). 
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